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Abstract
We develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws. The key
mechanism in our model is that parents’ decisions on family size interact with
their preferences for child labor regulation. If policies are endogenous, multiple
steady states with different child labor policies can exist. Consistent with em-
pirical evidence, the model predicts a positive correlation between child labor,
fertility, and inequality across countries of similar per-capita income. In addi-
tion, the theory implies that the political support for regulation should increase
if a rising skill premium induces parents to choose smaller families. The model
replicates features of the history of the U.K. in the nineteenth century, when reg-
ulations were introduced after a period of rising wage inequality, and coincided
with rapidly declining fertility rates and an expansion of education.
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Social concern about child labor is a historically recent phenomenon. Before the nine-
teenth century, child labor was not only com m o n ,b u ta l s oc o n s i d e r e dt ob eb e n e ﬁ c i a l
for children. Much more feared than child labor was its opposite, idlenessof children,
which was thought to lead to disorder, crime, and lack of preparation for a produc-
tive working life.1 Apart from being socially accepted, child labor was an important
economic factor. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in Britain children’s con-
tribution to household income in families not employed in agriculture averaged 25
to 30 percent (Horrell and Humphries 1999). In the same period, in the Northeast-
ern United States children comprised more than twenty percent of the work force in
manufacturing (Goldin and Sokoloff 1982).
Opposition to child labor and, ultimately, child labor laws arose only after the rise
of the factory system, which changed traditional employment patterns for children.
In Britain as well as the United States, trade unions and humanitarian organizations
were the decisive forces behind the introduction of child labor restrictions (CLR). In
Britain, the ﬁrst regulation of the employment of children was introduced in 1833, but
it was limited to the textile industry. A series of Factory Acts extended the restrictions
ﬁrst to the mines, in 1842, and then to other non-textile industries in the 1860s and
1870s. While humanitarian concern about the working conditions for children was
the main motive behind the early Factory Laws, in the second half of the nineteenth
century labor unions were the dominantforce pushing for additional restrictions. The
unions’ concern about child labor derived to a large extent from the fact that children
competed with unskilled adults in the labor market, and therefore exerted downward
pressure on wages. CLR came later in the U.S., with state regulation being introduced
mainly between 1880 and 1910, and federal statutes starting to appear in 1910-20. As
in the U.K., labor unions were the decisive force pushing for child labor legislation,
for much the same reasons: “The motivation of workers in supporting child labor
legislation in America was the same as it had been in Great Britain: the restriction of
child and female labor increased the demand for adult male labor.” (Nardinelli 1990,
p. 141)
1Similar arguments were still to be heard in the twentieth century. Opponents of a child labor bill
discussed by the state legislature of Georgia in 1900 argued that the “danger to the child was not in
work, but in idleness which led to vice and crime.” (Davidson 1939, p. 77). The bill was defeated.
1This paper develops a positive theory of child labor legislation. Our prime objec-
tive is to provide an explanation for the introduction of CLR in countries which were
previously characterized by widespread child labor. In addition, our theory also ad-
dresses the question why there is a lot of variation in child labor rates and CLR across
developing countries today. The ﬁrst building block of our theory, consistent with
the role of unions in the rise of CLR, is that a person’s preferences for CLR depend
on their income and their skill. As noted by Basu and Van (1998), children typically
compete with unskilled workers in the labor market, which implies that unskilled
workers will be in higher demand if child labor is restricted. Even unskilled workers
may support child labor, however, if their own children are working and contributing
to family income. The second building block of our theory is, therefore, that prefer-
ences for CLR are also related to the choice of family size. Parents with few children
have little to gain from child labor and are, ceteris paribus, more inclined to support
the introduction of restrictions. Parents with many working children, on the other
hand, tend to be harmed by CLR.
The fact that the potential competition might be part of a worker’s own family distin-
guishes child labor laws from other forms of labor regulation. Indeed, the working
class was far from unanimous in its support of CLR. Cunningham (1996) observes
that during the introduction of the ﬁrst restrictions in Lancashire “child labor found
its strongest and most persistent advocates within the working class, much to the
embarrassment of trade union leaders.” Similarly, when restrictions on child labor
were proposed in the mill villages in the Southern U.S., many workers were opposed
precisely because their own children were working: “For an adult male operative
whose entire family worked in the mill, factory legislation would reduce family in-
come. Such operatives tended to oppose child labor laws.” (Nardinelli 1990 p. 142)
The interdependence of family size and attitudes to CLR implies that political pref-
erences of a worker may differ before and after deciding on the number of children.
Before choosing family size, parents have a margin of adjustment to policy changes,
but this is lost once fertility decisions are taken. Moreover, there is a feedback mech-
anism that needs to be taken into account: the distributions of family size and factor
endowments in the population are endogenous, and their dynamics are affected by
the existence of CLR.
Toformallyanalyzetheseinteractions, weconstruct anoverlapping-generationsmodel
2with endogenous fertility and educational choice. In the model economy, all agents
are born identical, but, ex post, become heterogenous in productivity. In particular,
some become skilled workers, and some unskilled workers. Children can either work
or go to school. Education, which is chosen by altruistic parents, increases the prob-
ability of a child becoming a skilled adult worker. Parents face a quantity-quality
tradeoff in their decisions on children. Those who plan to make their children work
will tend to have more children in order to increase the family income from child
labor. Conversely, parents who send their children to school will tend to choose a
smaller family to economize on the cost of schooling.
We ﬁrst characterize the steady state equilibrium in a laissez-faire economy, i.e., ab-
sent CLR. We establish the existence of a unique steady state distribution over skill
types and family size. The economy without CLR is characterized by high fertility,
low social mobility, and high inequality. The children of skilled parents go to school
and, in majority, become skilled adults, whereas the children of unskilled parents
work and become unskilled adults. This implies a high correlation of earnings within
dynasties, hence, low social mobility. Moreover, since only rich children obtain edu-
cation, the share of unskilled workers in the population is high, which implies a high
skill premium and income inequality. In contrast, when CLR are present and per-
fectly enforced, all parents choose small families and educate their children. Thus,
the steady state with CLR is less unequal and characterized by higher social mobility.
Next, we study the political economy of CLR. Skilled workers never support CLR,
since child labor impliesa larger supply of unskilled labor, and higher skilled wages.2
We assume, however, that the unskilled workers can inﬂuence political decisions,
either directly in a democracy, or through their political organizations, e.g., trade
unions. Will they want to introduce restrictions? The answer is ambiguous. On
the one hand, CLR increase the unskilled wage by its effects on the relative supply of
skills. On the other hand, CLR cause a loss of child labor earnings, which is particu-
larly pronounced for poor families which are locked-in into a large family size. If the
second effect dominates, then poor households with large families may join the cause
of the rich and want to have the “right” to send their children to work.
2Since in our model there is no capital, the only conﬂict of interest is between skilled and unskilled
workers. Skilled workers in the model should be regarded as managers and ﬁrm-owners in the real
world, who were, historically, opposed to child labor legislation.
3When the political choice is endogenous, child labor laws are self-perpetuating, in
the sense that they induce fertility choices which create additional political support
for the restrictions. The feedback between fertility and political preferences may give
rise to multiple steady states. If child labor is unrestricted, unskilled workers choose
large families and make their children work. In this situation the loss of child labor
income can dominate the wage effect, so that all adults with children, including un-
skilled workers, oppose the introduction of restrictions. Conversely, in an otherwise
identical economy with restrictions already in place, unskilled workers have small
families and, therefore, support CLR. In each case, the existing political regime leads
to fertility decisions that lock parents into supporting the current policy. Multiple
steady state political equilibria can explain why some developing countries persis-
tently get locked-in into equilibria where a large proportion of children works and
political support for the introduction of CLR is low, while other countries at simi-
lar stages of development have strict regulations and a low incidence of child labor.
Moreover, in accordance with the data, the theory predicts that child labor should
correlate positively with fertility rates and income inequality.
Historically, we observed a change in attitudes towards child labor during the indus-
trial revolution, and a growing pressure of the union movement for CLR. How can
this change be explained? According to our theory, the political support for CLR can
rise over time if there is an increase in the return to education. Consider an economy
where all children of unskilled parents work. A progressive increase in the return to
schooling will eventually induce some of the newly formed families to have fewer
children and send them to school. The proportion of small families will keep increas-
ing as the wage premium continues its upwards trend and, eventually, a majority
of the unskilled workers will support CLR. If regulations are eventually introduced,
the trend of increasing wage inequality will, at least temporarily, be reversed due
to the relative supply effect (more children will go to school, thereby increasing the
number of skilled workers, while unskilled children are withdrawn from the labor
force). This prediction of the model is consistent with the observation that CLR were
ﬁrst introduced in Britain in the nineteenth century after a period of increasing wage
inequality. Moreover, the introduction of CLR was accompanied by a period of sub-
stantial fertility decline, which is again consistent with the predictions of the model.
This is the ﬁrst paper to provide a positive explanation for the spread of child labor
4laws. A large part of the existing theoretical literature on child labor develops ar-
guments why ruling out child labor might be welfare-improving.3 In Basu and Van
(1998), CLR can be beneﬁcial because parents dislike child labor, but have to send
their children to work if their income falls below the subsistence level. Ruling out
child labor can increase the unskilled wage sufﬁciently to push family incomes above
the subsistence level even when children do not work, leaving everyone better off.
In essence, the Basu-Van model has multiple equilibria in the labor market, and CLR
can be used to select the “good” equilibrium. A similar effect is at work in our model:
Unskilled workers who send their children to school prefer to rule out child labor in
order to increase their own wage. Contrary to Basu and Van, however, the wage ef-
fect is not large enough to render CLR universally welfare-improving. Other reasons
why child labor may be inefﬁcient are presented by Dessy and Pallage (2001), Baland
and Robinson (2000), and Ranjan (2001), who explore the role of coordination failures
and imperfections in ﬁnancial markets.
Thedeclineofchildlaborintheprocess ofdevelopmenthasbeenanalyzedbyBerdugo
and Hazan (2002). In their model, technical progress increases the return to educa-
tion and induces altruistic parents to switch from quantity to quality in their choice
of fertility and child-rearing (as in Galor and Weil 2000). Child labor declines in par-
allel to the rise of education. Since education, in turn, increases technical progress,
CLR may expedite the transition and temporarily foster growth. While Berdugo and
Hazan develop a representative-agent economy with exogenous policies, our paper
concentrates on distributional conﬂicts associated with the introduction of CLR. Our
approach is similar, in this respect, to that of Krueger and Tjornhom (2000), who use a
quantitative model to assess the welfare effect of child labor laws on different groups
of the population in the presence of human capital externalities. While certain groups
of workers can gain from a ban on child labor, compulsory education is generally the
preferable policy in their model. Krueger and Tjornhom abstract from fertility choice
and endogenous policies, however.
In the following section, we present empirical evidence on child labor and its regula-
tion. Section 3 describes the model economy. In Section 4 we analyze steady states for
ﬁxed policies and provide conditions for existence and uniqueness. Political economy
3A comprehensive overview of the economic literature on child labor can be found in the recent
surveys by Basu (1999) and Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2001).
5is introduced in Section 5. We introduce the concept of a steady state political equilib-
rium (SSPE), and show that there can be multiple SSPE. Section 6 demonstrates how
exogenous changes in the skill premium can trigger the introduction of child labor
laws, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
Child labor has almost disappeared in industrialized countries, while it continues
to be a large-scale phenomenon in developing countries. Figure 1 shows that child
labor rates are negatively correlated with GDP per capita in a sample of 106 countries
in 1990. There is, however, a remarkable variability of experiences across developing
countries of similar income levels. For instance, for countries with an income per
capita between $1000 and $3000 child labor rates range from less than one to over 35
percent.
According to our theory, the incidence of child labor across countries should be pos-
itively correlated with the average size of families. Figure 2 shows child labor rates
versus total fertility rates for the same 106 countries in 1990. As the ﬁgure shows,
there is indeed a strong positive correlation between the two variables. However,
since both fertility and child labor decrease with development, the correlation could
be spurious. To address this concern, we regressed child labor over fertility rates for
a panel of 125 countries from 1960 to 1990, with observations at ten-year intervals,
controlling for time dummies, log(GDP), log(GDP) squared, the share of agriculture
in employment, and the share of agriculture in employment squared.4 The coefﬁ-
cient on the fertility rate is positive and highly signiﬁcant. The point estimate is 1.3,
and the White standard error is 0.29 (the R2 of the regression is 0.89).5 The estimate
4Child labor is the percentageof children aged 10-14who are economically active. The total fertility
rate is deﬁned as the sum of age-speciﬁc fertility rates, i.e., the number of births dividedby the number
of women of a given age.
The fertility rate and the share of agriculture in employment are from the World Bank Development
Indicators, Ginis arefrom the Deininger-Squire dataset, GDP percapita is from the Penn World Tables,
and child labor from the ILO. We control for the share of agriculture because it is well known that child
labor is more widespread in the agricultural sector.
We ignore endogeneity problems, and the regression is simply meant to document correlation be-
tween the variables of interest.
5Similar result holds if one runs four separate cross-country regressions. The coefﬁcient on fertility
is always positive and highly signiﬁcant, except in 1960 when it is positive but not signiﬁcant.
6implies that a one standard deviation increase in the fertility rate is associated with
and increase in the child labor rate of 2.5 percent (the child labor rates varies in the
sample between 0 and 59 percent with a standard deviation of 15 percent). If we
add a measure of income inequality (Gini coefﬁcient), the point estimate of the effect
of inequality on child labor is positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant. If, in addition,
we include country ﬁxed-effects, the coefﬁcient on fertility becomes smaller (point
estimate of 0.41, with a White standard error of 0.20), but remains signiﬁcant.
Moreover, cross-country differences in child labor are persistent over time, even after
controlling for GDP and the share of agriculture. This accords well with the predic-
tion of our model that countries can get locked-in into different child labor regimes.
To document persistence, we computed residuals of the regression of child labor on
log(GDP), log(GDP) squared, the share of agriculture in employment, and the share
of share of agriculture in employment squared for 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990. For
each year, we grouped countries into quintiles according to the size of their residual.
The countries in the ﬁrst quintile are the 20 percent with the highest child labor rates
relative to the expected value given their income per capita and share of agriculture.
Table 1 displays the average ten-year transition probabilities between quintiles result-
ing from this data. After ten years, on average 80 percent of the countries starting in
the highest quintile are still there. Another 15 percent have moved to the second-
highest quintile, and only 5 percent are to be found in the three lower quintiles. Simi-
lar results are obtained for countries with unusually low child labor rates. Even if we
consider the entire period 1960 to 1990, we ﬁnd that 80 percent of the countries in the
highest quintile in 1960 are still in the top two quintiles in 1990.
The evidence discussed so far concerns the incidence of child labor across countries
and over time rather than the effect of regulations. A number of empirical studies
have measured the effects of legal restrictions on labor supply and the education of
children in order to assess whether the restrictions were actually binding. Peacock
(1984) documents that the British Factory Acts of 1833, 1844 and 1847 were actively
enforced by inspector and judges, resulting in a large number of ﬁrms having been
prosecuted and convicted already since 1834. Similarly, Galbi (1997) ﬁnds that the
share of children employed in English cotton mills fell signiﬁcantly after the intro-
duction of the restrictions in the 1830s. According to Nardinelli (1980), the Factory
Acts had a signiﬁcant effect in reducing child labor, especially in the textile industry,
7although mainly in the short run. Moving to the U.S., Acemoglu and Angrist (2000)
use state-by-state variation in child labor laws to estimate the size of human capi-
tal externalities. Using data from 1920 to 1960, their results suggest that CLR were
binding in most of this period. Margo and Finegan (1996) ﬁnd that the combina-
tion of compulsory schooling laws with child labor regulation is binding in the sense
that it signiﬁcantly raises school attendance, while compulsory schooling laws alone
have insigniﬁcant effects. Similarly, Angrist and Krueger (1991) ﬁnd that compulsory
schooling laws had a signiﬁcant effect on schooling in the 20th century. However,
Moehling (1999) studies the effect of state-by-state differences in minimum age lim-
its from 1880 until 1910, and ﬁnds that CLR contributed little to the decline in child
labor. The reason might be that pre-1900 state laws were often weakly enforced (see
Sanderson 1974).
A keypartof our theory isthat parentsface a tradeoff betweenthe numberofchildren
and the quality of each child. The notion of a quantity-quality tradeoff, going back to
Becker (1960) and Becker and Lewis (1973), was originally developed to account for
fertility behavior in developed countries, where there is strong evidence for such a
tradeoff. In both cross section and time series data, family size and education levels
tend to be negatively related. In developing countries the picture is more mixed, but
many studies still ﬁnd evidence of a quantity-quality tradeoff. Rosenzweigand Even-
son (1977)examine a data set from rural Indiaand ﬁnd fertility to be positively associ-
ated with child labor and negatively associated with schooling attainment. Similarly,
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) report that an exogenous increase in fertility reduces
child quality as measured by a schooling index, and Singh and Schuh (1986) ﬁnd that
child labor has a positive effect on fertility in rural Brazilian data. Ray (2000) studies
national household surveys from Peru and Pakistan, and documents that the number
of children in a family signiﬁcantly raises labor supply of children in Peru, whereas
the estimate for Pakistan is insigniﬁcant. In both Peru and Pakistan schooling is neg-
atively related to the number of children. Finally, Hossain (1990) ﬁnds that in rural
counties in Bangladesh high child labor wages are associated with larger family sizes
and lower levels of schooling.
As a background for the predictions of our model regarding the introduction of CLR,
we now turn to the historical circumstances accompanying the passing of such laws
in the major industrialized countries. A central prediction of our theory is that child
8labor laws will be introduced soon after unskilled workers start to reduce their family
size in order to provide more education to their children. We would therefore expect
that the introduction of CLR is accompanied by rapid fertility decline, with the peak
in fertility being reached before binding restrictions are put into place. This pattern
is conﬁrmed by evidence from the major European countries. Figure 3 shows birth
rates6 throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for England, France,
Germany, and Italy. As discussed above, in England the ﬁrst restrictions were put into
place with the Factory Laws of 1833, right after the peak in the birth rate. The laws
were expanded to virtually all industries in the 1860s and 1870s, and the minimum
age for employment was raised to 11 years in 1893 and 12 years in 1899. This second
phase of legislation follows a temporary recovery in the birth rate, and coincides with
a period of rapid fertility decline that started in the 1870s and continued into the
twentieth century.
Figure 3 shows that the birth rates in the other major European nations followed
a pattern similar to the British case. The only exception is France, where fertility
decline started earlier, and consequently fertility rates were lower throughout the
nineteenth century. The history of child labor legislation in other European countries
is remarkably similar to the case of the U.K. as well. As the early Factory Laws, the
ﬁrst restrictions to be passed generally lacked provisions for effective enforcement,
and therefore had little effect. Effective regulation of child labor was only achieved
towards the end of the nineteenth century, when birth rates were falling rapidly.
In France, a law passed in 1841 mandated a minimum age of eight for employment
and speciﬁed a maximum workday of eight hours for children aged eight to twelve.
In addition, working children under the age of twelve were also required to attend
school. The law applied only to ﬁrms with at least 20 workers however, and no
effective provisions for enforcement were made (Weissbach 1989). In 1874, a law
was passed that applied to all ﬁrms, set the minimum age to twelve, with minimum
schooling conditions for workers under the age of 15. In 1892 the minimum age for
employment was raised to 13. In Germany, before uniﬁcation in 1871 child labor was
regulated only in some parts of the country. Prussia led the way with a ﬁrst child
labor law in 1839, which required a minimum age of 9 for factories, mines, foundries,
and mills, and at least three years of schooling for child workers aged 9 and older. A
6Birth rates in Figure 3 and the share of agriculture in Figure 4 are from Mitchell (1998).
9similarlawwas adopted for the GermanEmpire after1871. In1878, the minimum age
in factories was raised to 12. According to Nardinelli (1990), the earlier laws (before
1878) were not effectively enforced. As in the German case, Italy achieved effective
regulation only after uniﬁcation. A ﬁrst child labor law was passed in Lombardy in
1843, before uniﬁcation. Education became compulsory in 1859, but initially there
was little enforcement of this law. A national child labor law was passed in 1873.
A notable feature of legislation in Europe is that laws were passed during the same
period in a number of countries, even though these countries were at very different
stages of development. Figure 4 shows the employment share of agriculture for the
major European nations. When effective CLR were put into place at the end of the
nineteenth century, England was an industrialized country, with the share of agricul-
ture approaching ten percent. At the other extreme, in Italy well over half of employ-
ment was still accounted for by agriculture. The differences in living standards were
also large. According to Maddison (1995), in 1890 GDP per capita in Italy was only
40 percent as high as in the U.K., and lower than GDP per capita in the U.K. in 1820.
Relative to the U.K., in 1890 France and Germany were at 57 and 62 percent, respec-
tively. Clearly, in the European case structural change in the economy is less closely
related to the introduction of CLR than changes in fertility behavior.
Further evidence for the relationship of fertility decline and political reforms can be
found in the New World. In the U.S., birth rates and total fertility rates were falling
from the beginning of the nineteenth century. However, the overall numbers mask
substantial variation across states and regions. Since until about 1910 all child labor
restrictions were state laws, this variation can be related to political developments.
Most states introduced laws mandating a minimum age for employment in the pe-
riod from 1880 to 1920. In 1880, only seven states had such laws; by 1910, 43 states
did. The ﬁrst states to introduce child labor restrictions were also the ﬁrst to experi-
ence substantial fertility decline. Consider the comparison of the eight states which
introduced a minimum age of employment of 14 until 1900 and the 14 states which
introduced this limit only after 19107. In the middle of the nineteenth century, birth
rates were slightly higher in the group of early adopters (in 1860, the birth rate was 30
7The states in the ﬁrst group are Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New York, and Wisconsin. The group of late adopters is made up of Alabama, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. Birth rate ﬁgures are from the U.S. Census.
10in the early group and 29 in the late group). However, after 1870 fertility decline pro-
gressed faster in the states which adopted child labor laws early. By 1890, the average
birth rate had fallen to 25 in the early group, but was still at 30 in the late group. This
birth-rate differential persisted throughout the ﬁrst part of the twentieth century; in
1928, the difference was still 19 to 24.
In summary, both in historical data and modern cross-country evidence there is a
clear link between fertility patterns, child labor, and the regulation of child labor. We
now turn to our model to analyze these relationships theoretically.
3 The Model
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of agents differing in
age and skill. There are two skill levels, high and low (h ∈{ S,U}), and two age
groups, young and old. Agents age and die stochastically. Each household consists
of one parent and her children, where the number of children depends on the par-
ent’s earlier fertility decisions. Children age (i.e., become adult) in each period with
probability λ. Whenever a child ages, her parent dies (hence, old agents die with
probability λ). As soon as they become adult, agents decide on their number of chil-
dren. For simplicity, there are only two family sizes, large (grand) and small (petite)
(n ∈{ G, P}).
All adults work and supply one unit of (skilled or unskilled) labor. Children may
either work or go to school. Working children provide l < 1 units of unskilled labor
in each period in which they work. Children in school supply no labor, and there
is a schooling cost, p, per child. When they become adult, children who worked in
the preceding period become skilled with probability π0, whereas educated children
become skilled with probability π1 > π0. For simplicity, we assume that only the
educational choice (e ∈{ 0,1} ) in the period before aging determines the probability
for an agent of becoming skilled (either π0 or π1).
In the model economy, all decisions are carried out by adult agents. Young adults
choose once-and-for-all how many children they want, as well as the education of
their children in the current period. Old adults are locked-in into the family size that
11they chose when becoming adult and, consequently, only choose the current educa-
tion of their children e ∈{ 0,1}. For an adult who has already chosen her number of
children, the individual state consists of the skill level and the number of children.
Vnh denotes the utility of an old agent with n children and skill h. Preferences are
deﬁned over consumption c, discounted future utility in case of survival, and the av-
erage discounted expected utility of the children in the case of death. The utility of






















c + pne ≤ wh (Ω)+( 1 − e)nlwU (Ω).
Here, u(·) is an increasing and concave function, Ω is the aggregate state of the econ-
omy (to be deﬁned in detail below), Ω  the state in the following period, wh the wage
for skill level h,a n de denotes the education decision, where e = 1 is schooling and
e = 0 is child labor. Consumption is restricted to be nonnegative. The probability of
survival is 1 − λ, and future utility is discounted by the factor β. With probability λ,
an adult passes away and applies discount factor βz to the children’s utility. Here, z
is allowed to differ from one, so that parents can value their children’s utility more or
less than they would value their own future utility. For utility to be well-deﬁned, we
assume that βz < 1. With probability πe, depending on the educational choice, the
offspring will be skilled.
Note thatafter their skill hasbeen realizedin the nextperiod, agingchildren will have
thepossibility ofchoosing theiroptimal familysize, hencetheterm maxn∈{G,P} Vnh (Ω ).
The budget constraint has consumption and, if e = 1, educational cost on the expen-
diture side and the wage income of the adult plus, if e = 0 ,t h ew a g ei n c o m eo ft h en
children on the revenue side. Note that children do not consume (this assumption is
easily relaxed). Once family size has been chosen by a young adult, the only remain-
ing decision is whether to educate the children or send them to work. The decision
problem is also simpliﬁed by the fact that the number of children does not enter the
utility parents derive from their children, since they care about their average utility.
Parents will therefore have a large number of children only if they expect to send
12them to work, because in that case more children result in a higher income.
The main differences between our setup and the standard altruistic family model
of Becker and Barro (1988) are that in our model, altruism does not depend on the
numberof children, and only two choiceseach for education andfertility are possible.
Weintroduce these simpliﬁcationspartly foreaseof exposition, andpartly tofacilitate
the computation of voting equilibria. Despite the simpliﬁcations, the key implications
of our model are similar to richer models with a continuous fertility choice.8
We now move to the production side of the economy. The consumption good is pro-
duced with a technology using skilled and unskilled labor as inputs. The technology
features constant returns to scale and a decreasing marginal product to each factor.
Formally, we can write the output per unskilled worker, y,a s
y = f (x),
where x ≡ XS/XU is the skill ratio, and f is an increasing and concave function.
Labor markets are competitive, and wages are equal to the marginal product of each
factor
wS = f   (x),( 2 )
wU = f (x) − f   (x) x.( 3 )
The main role of the production setup is to generate an endogenous skill premium.
Wages depend on the supply of skilled and unskilled labor. If child labor is restricted,
the supply of unskilled labor falls, and therefore the unskilled wage rises. This wage
effect is one of the key motives that determines agents’ preferences over CLR (the
other motive being potential child labor income, which, in turn, depends on the num-
ber of children)9.
We still need to determine the supply of workers at each skill level. It simpliﬁes the
8Doepke (2001)considers the choice of educationversuschild labor inanotherwise standardBarro-
Becker model with skilled and unskilled workers. As in our model, unskilled workers are more likely
to choose child labor, and fertility is higher conditional on choosing child labor. The main difference is
that in Doepke (2001)the fertility differentialis endogenous, while it is exogenously ﬁxed in our setup.
9The unskilled workers would never support child labor laws if child labor and unskilled labor
were complements instead of substitutes. Interestingly, almost all early child labor laws in Europe and
the U.S. explicitly excluded agriculture, where it is often argued that adult and child labor are indeed
complementary.
13exposition to restrict attention to economies where all children who do not work go
to school. This is necessarily a feature of the equilibrium if the cost of education is
sufﬁciently small. We will denote by xnh the total number of adults of each type after
family size has been determined by the young adults, and deﬁne
Ω = {xPU, xGU, xPS, xGS}
as the state vector.10 The number of working children is equal to
L = l ((1 − eGU) xGU +( 1 − eGS) xGS)G + l ((1 − ePU) xPU +(1 − ePS) xPS) P,( 4 )
where enh denotes the educational choice of parents of type n,h. The supply of skilled
and unskilled labor, respectively, is given by
XS = xPS + xGS,
XU = xPU + xGU + L.
The state vector Ω follows a Markov process such that
Ω  =( ( 1 − λ) · I + λ · Γ(ηU,ηS))· Ω,( 5 )
where I is the identity matrix, ηU,ηS denote the proportion of young unskilled and
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10Note that young adults choose their family size at the beginning of the period, before anything
else happens. After their choice, they become old adults. The state vector summarizes the number of
workers of each type after this decision has been taken. Thus, formally, this decision is subsumed into
the law of motion.
14is a transition matrix, conditional on the choice of family size of the young adults.11
We restrict attention to economies such that the skilled wage is larger than the un-
skilled wage. Furthermore, we impose the stronger requirement that skilled adults
always receive higher consumption than unskilled adults, even if the former choose
a small family and educate their children, whereas the latter choose a large family
of working children. To this aim, recall that wages are given by marginal products
and depend on the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor supply. The highest possible
ratio of skilled to unskilled labor supply is given by x ≡ π1/(1 − π1),w h i c hy i e l d s
t h el o w e s tp o s s i b l ew a g ep r e m i u m .W et h e nf o r m a l i z et h ed e s i r e dr e s t r i c t i o nb yt h e
following assumption.
Assumption 1
f  (x) − pP > [f(x) − f  (x)x](1 + Gl)
We are now ready to deﬁne an equilibrium for our economy. In the deﬁnition, we
assume that the child labor policy is exogenous, i.e, the amount of unskilled labor l
that children can supply is ﬁxed. It is easy to extend the deﬁnition to the case of an
exogenous, but time-varying policy, by adding a time subscript to l and switching to
a sequential deﬁnition of an equilibrium. Later on, we will also consider equilibria
with an endogenous policy choice.
Deﬁnition 1 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium) Anequilibriumconsistsoffunctions
(of the state vector Ω)V nh,e nh,w h,a n dηh,w h e r en∈{ G, P} and h ∈{ U,S}, and a law of
motion m for the state vector, such that:
• Utilities Vnh satisfy the Bellman equation (1), and education decisions enh attain the
maximum in (1).
11Consider, for instance, the measure of adult unskilled workers with small families, xPU,t+1.
(1 − λ) xPU,t is the measure of surviving old unskilled adults with small families. The rest consists
of young adults: ληU (1− π1) PxPU,t children of unskilled parents with small families who had given
their offspring aneducation, ληU (1 − π0) GxGU,t children of unskilled parentswith large families who
had given their offspring no education, ληU (1 − π1) PxPS,t children of skilled parents with small fam-
ilies who had given their offspring an education, and, ﬁnally, ληU (1− π0) GxGS,t children of skilled
parents with large families who had given their offspring no education. A similar reasoning applies to
the remaining variables.
15• Decisions of young adults are optimal, i.e., for h ∈{ U,S}:
If ηh(Ω)=0:VGh(Ω) ≥ VPh(Ω),
if ηh(Ω)=1:VGh(Ω) ≤ VPh(Ω),
if ηh(Ω) ∈ (0,1) : VGh(Ω)=VPh(Ω),
• Wages wh are given by (2) and (3).
• For Ω  = m(Ω), the law of motion, m, satisﬁes (5).
4 Steady States with Fixed Policies
We begin the analysis of the model by examining steady states with exogenous poli-
cies. Formally, we assume child labor to be unrestricted. However, the analysis also
comprises steady states with CLR, since ruling out child labor amounts to setting the
parameter governing child labor supply to zero: l = 0.
In the model, each adult must decide on family size and whether to educate her chil-
dren or send them to work. The situation is simpliﬁed since every adult choosing
to send children to work will choose a large family, because having children is cost-
less, and having more children increases the income from child labor. Conversely,
parents who decide to educate their children will always choose a small family, since
education is costly and, given that parents care only about the average utility of their
children, there is no beneﬁt from having additional children.
Another immediate implication of the model is that if unskilled parents are willing to
choose small families and educate their children, skilled parents will also do so. The
reason is that the gain from educating children (the added utility for the children)
is the same for the two types of parents, whereas the cost of education (direct cost
plus lost child labor income) is higher for unskilled parents in utility terms, since the
unskilled wage is lower.
We deﬁne a steady state as a situation where the fraction of each type of adult in
the population is constant, and a constant fraction ηU of unskilled parents decide to
16have small families. Deﬁne Nt = xPU,t + xGU,t + xPS,t + xGS,t. Further, let ξj ≡ xj/N,
Ξ = {ξPU, ξGU, ξPS, ξGS} and gt = Nt+1/Nt − 1.
In steady state, the law of motion (5) specializes to
(1 + g) · Ξ =( ( 1 − λ) · I + λ · Γ(ηU,ηS))· Ξ,( 6 )
1 · Ξ = 1. (7)
The education decisions are known in advance, since in steady state all agents with
small families educate their children, and all agents with large families choose child
labor. Note that (6)-(7) deﬁne a system of ﬁve linear equations in ﬁve unknowns,
ξPU,ξGU,ξPS,ξGS and g.
Deﬁnition 2 (Steady State Equilibrium) Asteadystate equilibrium(SSE)consistsoffrac-
tions ηU ∈ [0,1] and ηS ∈ [0,1] of unskilled and skilledparents, respectively,decidingto have
small families, utilities VPS,V GS, VPU,V GU of each type of family, an education decision for
each type, a child labor supply L, wages wS and wU, a vector of constant fractions of each
family type, Ξ = {ξPS,ξGS,ξPU,ξGU}, and a population growth rate g such that:
• Wages wS and wU are given by (2) and (3 ).
• Child labor supply L is given by (4).
• The vector of fractions of family types, Ξ, and the population growth rate g are solutions
to the laws of motion (6)-(7).
• The utilities satisfy (1), and education decisions are optimal.
• Decisions of young adults are optimal, i.e., for h ∈{ U,S}:
If ηh = 0:VGh ≥ VPh,
if ηh = 1:VGh ≤ VPh,
if ηh ∈ (0,1) : VGh = VPh.
Wearenowreadytoestablishthree lemmaswhichareuseful forcharacterizingsteady
states.
17Lemma 1 In steady state, VGS − VPS < VGU − VPU. Hence:
1. VGS ≥ VPS (ηS > 0)i m p l i e st h a tV GU > VPU (ηU = 0), and
2. VGU ≤ VPU (ηU > 0)i m p l i e st h a tV GU < VPU (ηS = 1).
Lemma 1 shows that if skilled adults do not strictly prefer small families, unskilled
adults will strictly prefer large families ofworking children. The intuition isthat since
skilled adults have a higher income, their utility cost of providing education to their
children is smaller. Therefore, skilled parents are generally more inclined towards
educating their children than unskilled parents.
The next lemma establishes the intuitive result that population growth falls in the
fraction of agents deciding to have small families.
Lemma 2 The steady state population growth rate g has the following properties.
1. If ηS = 1, then
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, γS (0)=Ga n dγS (1)=γ(0). The population
growth rate g is a strictly decreasing function of the fraction ηS of skilled adults with
small families.
Next, we establish that the fraction of skilled adults in the population strictly in-
creases in ηU and ηS. Once more, this is an intuitive result, since a higher ηU (ηS)
18means that more unskilled (skilled) parents decide to educate their children, which
raises the probability of being skilled as an adult.
Lemma 3 The fraction ξPS of skilled adults with small families is strictly increasing in ηU.
The fraction ξGU of unskilled adults with large families is strictly decreasing in ηS.T h er a t i o
of skilled to unskilled labor supply increases with both ηU and ηS. Hence, the equilibrium
skilled (unskilled) wage decreases (increases) with both ηU and ηS.
Recall that by Lemma 1, ηU > 0 implies that ηS = 1a n dηS < 1 implies ηU = 0. Then,
potential steady states can be indexed by the sum ˜ η ≡ ηS + ηU,w h e r e˜ η ∈ [0,2] and,
by Lemma 3, the steady state equilibrium skill premium is decreasing in ˜ η.12 Five
potential types of steady states can be distinguished:
1. All agents educate their children, ˜ η = 2.
2. All skilled workers and a positive proportion of the unskilled workers educate
their children, ˜ η ∈ (1,2).
3. All skilled workers and no unskilled workers educate their children, ˜ η = 1.
4. A positive proportion of the skilled workers and no unskilled workers educate
their children, ˜ η ∈ (0,1).
5. No agents educate their children, ˜ η = 0.
In steady states with either ˜ η = 2o r˜ η = 0, all agents behave identically. When
˜ η = 2, in spite of the wage premium being at its lower bound, all children receive an
education and all families are small. Conversely, when ˜ η = 0, the wage premium is at
its upper bound, all children work, and all families are large. In the steady state with
˜ η = 1, at the equilibrium wage, all unskilled parents have large families and make
their children work, while skilled workers ﬁnd it optimal to educate their children.
Finally, when ˜ η ∈ (1,2) or ˜ η ∈ (0,1) either the skilled or the unskilled parents are just
indifferent between having large uneducated or small educated families. The formal
12Note that whenever ˜ η takes on an integer value, i.e., ˜ η ∈{ 0,1,2} all agents in (at least) one group
strictly prefer one of the two educational choices. If ˜ η ∈ (0,1), skilled workers are indifferent, whereas
if ˜ η ∈ (1,2), unskilled workers are indifferent.
19conditions for each of the steady states to hold as an equilibrium are provided in the
appendix.
We now analyze the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady state
equilibrium. We prove the existence of a unique steady state by establishing that, for
all agents, the difference between the utilities from having small educated or large
uneducated families is strictly increasing in the wage premium.
The argument can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 5. In the plot, the downward-
sloping schedule SS1 representsthe negative relationship betweenthe wagepremium
wS/wU and ˜ η that follows from Lemma 3. Intuitively, an increase in the relative
supply of skills, parameterized by ˜ η, decreases the skill premium. The piecewise
positive schedule EErepresents the optimal steadystate educational choice of parents
as a function of the wage premium.13 In particular, for a range of low wage premia,
all agents prefer not to educate their children (˜ η = 0). For an intermediate range
of wage premia, education is chosen only by skilled agents (˜ η = 1). For a range of
high wage premia, all agents prefer education (˜ η = 2). Between these regions, there
exist threshold wage premia wS/wU and ¯ wS/ ¯ wU at which, respectively, either skilled
workers (˜ η ∈ (0,1)) or unskilled workers (˜ η ∈ (1,2)) are indifferent. If the difference
between the utilities from educating or not educating children is strictly increasing
in the wage premium, the thresholds wS/wU and ¯ wS/ ¯ wU are unique, as in Figure 5.
In this case, the steady state equilibrium is unique and corresponds to one of the ﬁve
types of steady states discussed earlier. If the difference between the utilities from
educating or not educating children were non-monotonic, however, there could exist
multiple thresholds (i.e., the EE curve could be locally decreasing), and the steady
state equilibrium could fail to be unique.
The threshold wS/wU is necessarily unique. Namely, the difference between the util-
ities from small educated or large uneducated families is strictly increasing in the
wage premium for skilled parents. The same monotonicity does not necessarily hold
for unskilled parents, however, for the following reason. On the one hand, as the
skill premium rises, education becomes more attractive to unskilled agents, since the
13Educational decisions not only depend on the ratio, but also on the level of both the skill and un-
skilled wage. In the particular case of CRRA utility and no cost of education (p = 0), the educational
choice only depends on the ratio, however. While the ﬁgure is correct for a given technology, compar-
ative statics (e.g., a change in the skill bias of technology that shifts the SS schedule while not affecting
the EE schedule) are legitimate only under CRRA utility and p = 0.
20utility from potential skilled descendants increases. On the other hand, a higher skill
premium also implies that unskilled parents earn a lower wage, and this increases the
utility cost of paying the ﬁxed cost of education.14 If the curvature of utility is high,
the latter effect may dominate. In fact, if marginal utility is inﬁnite at zero, unskilled
adults have no choice but to have large families whenever the education cost exceeds
their income. To obtain a unique steady state, we must therefore introduce an addi-
tional assumption that bounds the curvature of utility in the relevant range. Under
CRRA preferences, a sufﬁcient, though not necessary, condition is:
Assumption 2
(1 + Gl)
1 − β(1 − λ)
1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z(π1 − π0)))
>
u (wU,2 − pP)
u  (wU,2(1 + Gl)))
.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption (2) and CRRA preferences, there exists a unique steady
state.
Consider, now, the effect of changes in technology that raise the skill premium. For
example, assume an increase in the share of skilled labor, denoted by α, undera Cobb-
Douglas technology (the same exercise can be performed with a more general CES
production function). Suppose that, initially, α is low. Then, the supply schedule
would be described by the SS0 (dashed) schedule, with the equilibrium featuring
˜ η = 0. An increase in α would shift the schedule to the right, while the EE curves
remain unaffected. Thus, the steady state equilibrium would feature an increasing ˜ η.
For some intermediate level of α, the supply schedule is given by the SS1 schedule. In
this case, ˜ η ∈ (1,2), i.e., all skilled and some unskilled workers educate their children.
Eventually, for large values of α, the curve shifts to SS2 and all workers educate their
children.
5 Steady States with Endogenous Policies
So far, we have established that the model has a unique steady state when parents
can choose freely whether to make their children work. Imposing CLR is equivalent
14The same problem does not arise for skilled workers, since an increase in the wage premium
implies an increase in their income and, therefore, a lower utility cost to provide education.
21to reducing the parameter l, or setting it to zero when child labor has been completely
banned. Therefore, the previous section shows that there is a unique steady state for
any child labor policy that is exogenously ﬁxed (given that Assumption 2 holds). 15
It is easy to construct examples where, for instance, all parents choose large families
with working children (˜ η = 0) if there are no CLR, but the introduction of CLR moves
the economy to a steady state equilibrium where all parents choose small families
with educated children (˜ η = 2). Assume that the cost of schooling is inﬁnitesimal
(p → 0) and that CLR takes the extreme form of a complete ban, i.e., l = 0. Then,
it is immediate that, under CLR, all parents would choose small families and send
their children to school (in Figure 1, the EE line would be horizontal at ˜ η = 2). In
the absence of CLR, an equilibrium with ˜ η = 0 holds if condition (18) is satisﬁed. If
preferences are logarithmic, this can be expressed as
ln(1 + Gl) ≥ βλz
π1 − π0







where the wage premium depends on G, π0 and π1, but not on the discount factor
βλz. Thus, in economies with sufﬁciently low βλz, the inequality (8) holds and the
steady state features widespread child labor if there are no CLR.
While CLR was treated as exogenous in this example, the main objective of this sec-
tion istoestablishthe possibilityof multiplesteadystateswith differentpolicieswhen
the choice of policy is endogenous. In order to carry out this analysis, we must specify
a political mechanism in the model. We assume that CLR can be irreversibly intro-
duced by a majority of adult agents. Clearly, this “referendum” decision is a stand-in
for more complicated decision processes whereby different groups in society can ex-
ert political pressure to introduce restricting laws. Whatwe are mainlyinterested in is
to analyze under which conditions the “working class” (unskilled workers) supports
the introduction of CLR.16 We will also ask the opposite question. Namely, would a
majority in an economy where CLR have been in effect for long time vote for CLR to
15Note that decreasing l moves both the SS and the EE curves to the left in Figure 5. Thus, the
wage premium unambiguously falls, whereas the effect on the educational choice is, in principle,
ambiguous.
16In our analysis, we abstract from the question of how much political inﬂuence a majority of poor
workers canexert. Clearly, majority voting is not a good representation of the political process in many
developing countries. Nevertheless, as long as the poor — i.e., the only group that has ambiguous
preferences on CLR — has some inﬂuence, it is essential to study their political stand on this issue.
22be abandoned?
T h em a i nr e s u l ti st h a tt h e r ee x i s tp a r a m e t er conﬁgurations such that, if the economy
is in a steady state with no CLR, a majority of the adults (the skilled and some or
all of the unskilled) will vote against the introduction of CLR. Conversely, if CLR
exist, a majority of the adults (some or all of the unskilled) will vote to keep the
restrictions in place. The source of this multiplicity is that old adults are locked-in
into the family size that they chose when they became adult, which determines their
policy preferences. As in the example above, absent CLR unskilled workers would
choose large families and make their children work, whereas, if CLR were in place,
they would choose small families and educate their children. This feedback between
political decisions and family size gives rise to multiple steady states. For simplicity,
we will state the analytical results under the assumption that the child labor policy
includes compulsory schooling.17
Deﬁnition 3 (Steady State Political Equilibrium) A steady state political equilibrium
(SSPE) consists of a child labor policy (child labor is either ruled out or not), ˜ η ∈ [0,2]
denoting the distribution of educational choices, utilities VPS,V GS, VPU,V GU of each type
of family, a child labor supply L, constant fractions ξPS, ξGS, ξPU,a n dξGU of each type of
family, and a population growth rate g that:
• Given the policy, all conditions in Deﬁnition 2 are satisﬁed.
• A majority of adults obtain higher utility under the current child labor policy than if
the opposite policy were permanently introduced.
Consider, ﬁrst, a candidate SSPE where child labor is unrestricted. For this SSPE to
be sustained, a majority of adults must prefer to keep child labor unrestricted, as op-
posed to switching to CLR forever. To make the problem interesting, we assume that
the old unskilled are in majority (skilled agents always prefer no CLR) and that at
least some of them have large families in the unrestricted steady state. We need to
compare the utility of old unskilled agents in the steady state with no CLR to the util-
i t yt h e yo b t a i ni fC L Ra r ei n t r o d u c e d .O n c eC L Ra r ep u ti n t op l a c e ,a l ly o u n ga d u l t s
17If the CLR does not include a compulsory schooling provision, the result establishing multiplicity
of steady states still goes through, but requires additional, if natural, assumptions on the production
function.
23must educate their children and therefore choose small families. The old unskilled
are stuck with large families, but they have to educate their children as well. The
immediate effect of CLR is a decline in the wage premium, since the stock of children
of unskilled families is suddenly withdrawn from the labor force, which increases
the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor supply. Thereafter, the skill ratio in the adult
population continues to increase gradually, since, in the new environment, all par-
ents educate their children. Thus, the wage premium falls monotonically to the new
steady state level.
Consider, next, a candidate SSPE with CLR already in place. Given CLR, everyone
is forced to educate their children. Therefore, all parents choose small families. For
this situation to be an SSPE, the old unskilled majority must prefer to keep rather
than eliminate the existing CLR. The steady state utility for unskilled workers asso-
ciated with the status quo (CLR) must be compared with the utility that prevails if
CLR are abandoned and the economy converges to a new steady state. As before,
we assume that without CLR some unskilled workers, at least, choose large families
(otherwise CLR would be irrelevant). If unskilled workers prefer large families and
child labor at the steady state without CLR, a fortiori, they do so at the wages prevail-
ing in the steady state with CLR, since the skill premium is lower, making education
even less attractive. Therefore, once CLR are lifted, young unskilled (and, possibly,
also skilled) parents will start choosing large families and make their children work,
thereby causing the skill premium to rise over time.
From the perspective of old unskilled agents, who form the majority, CLR implies
both gains and losses. The former are associated with higher unskilled wages, while
the latter are associated with the opportunity cost of child labor income. The tradeoff
between these two effects determines whether they support CLR. The key factor for
multiple SSPE to emerge is the lock-in into family size decisions. For parents of large
families the opportunity cost of child labor, as well as the cost of education, is higher
than for parents of small families. Thus, ceteris paribus, families that were formed
under no CLR are less supportive of introducing a ban on child labor, since they have
more children. Conversely, familiesformed underCLR are more supportive of retain-
ing the ban on child labor, since they have fewer children. Building on this intuition,
Proposition 2 formally establishes that there are parameters such that multiple SSPE
exist.
24Proposition 2 The model parameters can be chosen such that:
• The old unskilled are the majority.
• In the absence of CLR, the steady state features ˜ η < 2.
• Both CLR and no CLR are SSPE.
We now illustrate the theoretical results obtained so far by analyzing steady states in
a parameterized version of our economy. Table 2 displays the parameter values used.
Preferences are CRRA with risk-aversion parameter σ. The production function is of
the constant-elasticity-of-substitution form
Y =[ αXκ




The fertility values for small and large families are P = 1a n dG = 3. A family of
two would therefore have two children if they prefer education, or six children if
they opt for child labor. This fertility differential approximates the fertility differen-
tial between mothers in the lowest and highest income quintiles in countries with
widespread child labor, such as Brazil or Mexico (see Kremer and Chen 2000). The
probability of death λ = 0.15 and the probabilities π0 = 0.05 and π1 = 0.4 of be-
coming skilled are chosen such that the old unskilled are always the majority of the
population, and therefore politically are decisive.18 The choice for λ implies that
adults on average live for 62
3 periods. If we assume that people survive 40 years on
average after becoming adults, a model period corresponds to six years. The rate of
time preference implied by our choice of β would generate an annual interest rate of 4
percent per year (if assets could be traded), which is the standard basis for calibrating
β in the RBC literature. The choice l = 0.1 for the supply of child labor implies that
a large family with working children derives about a quarter of family income from
children, which is in line with evidence from Britain in the period of early industri-
alization ( Horrell and Humphries 1995) and recent data from developing countries.
The elasticity parameter σ = 0.5 sets the elasticity of substitution half way between
18If the skilled adults have political control, CLR are never introduced, since skilled agents always
oppose CLR. Even in a more complicated political mechanism where different groups can exert politi-
cal pressure, the unskilled adults would be important, since they arethe only group whose preferences
over CLR are, in principle, ambiguous.
25the Cobb-Douglas and the linear production technology. The weight α of skilled labor
in the production function is left unspeciﬁed for now. We will use α to parameterize
the skill premium and compute outcomes for a variety of α.
We start by determining which steady states and SSPE exist for different values of
α. Recall from Section 4 that as long as Assumption 2 is satisﬁed, there is a unique
steady state in the economy without voting. Figure 6 displays the steady state ˜ η as
af u n c t i o no fα.F o rl o wα, the skill premium is low. Consequently, education is not
very attractive, and there is a range of α where all parents prefer child labor (˜ η = 0).
As the skill premium rises, we reach a threshold for α at which a fraction of skilled
adults educates their children (˜ η ∈ (0,1)), and ultimately all skilled parents choose
education (˜ η = 1). For even higher α, there is a wide region in which unskilled
parents are indifferent between education and child labor (˜ η ∈ (1,2)). Throughout
this region, higher α are offset by a higher supply of skilled labor, which keeps the
unskilled parents indifferent. Ultimately, all parents educate their children (˜ η = 2).
Figure 7 considers the model with voting, and shows which SSPE exist as a function
of α.F o r l o w v a l u e s o f α, the only SSPE is no CLR. In other words, the return to
education is so low that even a population of adults all of whom have small families
would vote to abandon CLR. For an intermediate range of α, there are multiple SSPE:
both CLR and no CLR are steady states supported by a majority of the population. In
the range of multiplicity, in the absence of CLR at least a fraction of unskilled agents
would choose child labor and large families. However, if CLR are already in place,
unskilled parents are locked into having small families, and therefore prefer to keep
CLR. As the wage premium increases, we enter a region where CLR is the only SSPE.
Ultimately, even unskilled parents with large families prefer to introduce CLR. The
immediate income loss after the introduction of CLR is made up by higher unskilled
wages in the present (because other parents’ children can no longer work) and in the
future (which they care about because they care for their children).
To show that the multiplicity result depends on endogenous fertility choice, we also
computed outcomes without fertility differentials by setting P = G = 1 , i.e., families
of working and educated children are of the same size. We still ﬁnd that, for low α’s,
no CLR is an SSPE, and for high α’s CLR is an SSPE. However, there is no overlap,
i.e., in no region both policies can be supported in steady state, since the policies
no longer lock agents into different fertility choices. In fact, there is a region where
26neither policy is an SSPE. The reason for the non-existence of SSPE for some α is the
endogenous skill premium. If CLR are in place, the supply of skilled labor is high,
and the skill premium is low. The low skill premium makes child labor attractive
relative to education, so that a majority is in favor of abandoning CLR. If there are no
restrictions, however, the supply of skilled labor is low and the skill premium is high.
This makes education more attractive, and increases the gain from removing other
parents’ children from the labor market, and thus, amajority is in favorof introducing
CLR.
6 The Introduction of Child Labor Laws
So far, we have shown that the interaction of fertility choice and political preferences
can lead toa lock-in effect, resulting in multiple SSPE, eitherwith child labor andhigh
fertility or no child labor and low fertility. This feature of the model can explain why
there is a great deal of variation in the incidence of child labor around the world, even
when controlling for income per capita. However, we also need to explain why many
countries have adopted child labor bans over the last two centuries, starting from a
situation where child labor wascommon all over the world. In our model, a transition
from no CLR to CLR is possible if technological change increases the skill premium,
and therefore the return to education. If the increase in the return to education is
large, even unskilled adults prefer to have small families and educate their children,
which ultimately creates a majority in favor of the introduction of CLR.
This explanation of the introduction of CLR is consistent with evidence on the evolu-
tion of the skill premium in the U.K. before the introduction of CLR. Figure 8 shows
that the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages increased sharply at the beginning of the
19th century in the U.K. 19 The skill premium reached a peak in 1850, declined sub-
sequently, and by 1910 it had returned to its 1820 level. Following shortly after the
initial rise in the skill premium, the ﬁrst child labor restrictions (the “Factory Acts”)
19The skill-premium data, from Williamson 1985, is computed as the ratio of the wages in twelve
skilled and six unskilled professions, weighted by employment shares. This data source is criticized
by Feinstein (1988),who presents alternativeestimates indicating a smaller hump in skill premia. Even
a ﬂatter proﬁle of the skill premium, however, would indicate a signiﬁcant increase in the demand for
skills, given the simultaneous increase in their supply associated with rising education in the labor
force.
27were put into place in 1833 and 1842. The initial Factory Acts, however, only applied
to some industries (textiles and mining), and Nardinelli (1980) argues that while the
laws effectively restricted the employment of young children in these industries, the
effect on overall child labor was short lived. The Factory Acts were extended to other
non-textile industries in the 1860s and 1870s. The introduction of compulsory school-
ing in 1880 put an additional constraint on child labor. Compulsion was effectively
enforced: in the 1880s, close to 100,000 cases of truancy were prosecuted every year
(see Cunningham 1996), which made truancy the second-most popular offense in
terms of cases brought before the courts (drunkenness being the ﬁrst).
Figure 9shows the evolution of the total fertility rate (deﬁnedasinSection 2). Fertility
peaked around 1820, then started declining before the introduction of the Factory
Acts. Then, a second more pronounced decline in fertility is observed after 1880 and
continued throughout the ﬁrst quarter of the twentieth century. Figures 10 and 11
show the corresponding decline in child labor rates (the fraction of 10 to 14 year-
olds who were economically active) and increase in schooling rates (the fraction of
children aged 5-14 at school).
To show that our model is capable of generating a transition to CLR, we computed
transition paths triggered by an exogenous increase in the skill premium. A rising
skill premium can be parameterized by an increase in the parameter α in the pro-
duction function. We chose the speciﬁc tran s i t i o np a t hs u c ht h a ti nt h es t e a d ys t a t e
without CLR, the wage premium in the model matches the observed value of 2.5 in
the U.K. around 1820 (see Figure 8). This is achieved by setting the initial α to 0.33.
The endpoint of the transition was chosens u c ht h a ti nt h es t e a d ys t a t ew i t hC L R ,
the skill premium matches 2.5 as well, as in the data around 1910. This implies a
ﬁnal value for α of 0.65. In the computed transition path, α is at 0.33 until period
2, and then increases linearly until the maximum of 0.65 is reached in period 9 (see
Figure 12).
Generally, the problem of computing transitions paths with an endogenous policy
choice is complicated. Agents’ decisions depend on the entire path of expected fu-
ture policies. Future policies therefore partly determine the evolution of the state
vector of the economy which, in turn, affects the preferences over these same poli-
cies. This interdependence can lead to multiple equilibria (not just multiplicity of
steady states), or the nonexistence of equilibria. In principle, these problems could
28arise in our framework, but it turns out that unique results are obtained for the cali-
brated version of our model. To limit the number of time paths of future policies, we
assume that once CLR are introduced, they cannot be revoked. 20 Future policies can
therefore be indexed by the period when CLR are introduced.
The conditions for the introduction of CLR to occur in a given period T can there-
fore be checked as follows. We assume that the economy starts in the steady state
corresponding to the initial value of α. First, we compute private decisions and the
evolution of the state vector Ω under the assumption that CLR are indeed introduced
at time T.I np e r i o dT, we check whether a majority prefers the introduction of CLR
to the alternative. The relevant alternative here is not to introduce CLR at T,b u tt o
expect their introduction at T + 1 (the skill premium and therefore the incentive to
introduce CLR increases over time, therefore if T is the equilibrium switching time,
the switch would certainly occur at T + 1.). We also must check that CLR are not
introduced before T. Once more, because the incentive to introduce CLR increases
over time, it is sufﬁcient to check that given the path for the state variable resulting
from expecting the switch at T, there is still a majority opposed to introducing CLR
at time T − 1. In summary, for T to be an equilibrium switching time, conditional
on agents expecting CLR to be introduced at time T, a majority must prefer no CLR
at time T − 1, and a majority must prefer CLR at time T . Since the evolution of the
state vector depends on the expected policies, there could be, in principle, multiple
or none such switching times, but in our example there is a unique switching time.
In the computed transition path, a majority continues to oppose the introduction of
CLR in the ﬁrst periods of the increasing wage premium. Beginning in period 5,
however, all young unskilled adults start to choose education and small families, in
response totheincreasingskill premiumandtheexpectedfuture introduction of CLR.
Old unskilled families are stuck with many children and therefore continue to choose
child labor. In period 7, unskilled families with small families form the majority of
the population and vote for a permanent introduction of CLR.
Figure 13 shows the evolution of the skill premium during the transition. Initially,
the skill premium increases due to an increasing α. Once CLR are introduced and
20We conjecture that in our speciﬁc application the results would not change if we allowed CLR to be
revokable in later periods, because we focus on an episode where the skill premium is increasing over
time, which together with the lock-in effectof endogenous fertility choice tends to increase support for
CLR over time.
29children are withdrawn from the labor market the skill premium drops, however,
since the increase in α is offset by the smaller supply of unskilled labor. After α
stops increasing, the skill premium declines further, as the number of skilled workers
gradually increases. The introduction of CLR also leads to a sharp decline in pop-
ulation growth (Figure 15), because all unskilled parents then have small families.
Notice, however, that the decline in population growth starts even before CLR are
introduced, because young unskilled families start to have small families already in
period 5. The switch in the decisions of young unskilled parents also triggers an im-
mediate decline in the supply of child labor, as shown by Figure 14. Thus, child labor
declines even before CLR are introduced. However, the future introduction of CLR is
still responsible for part of the decline in child labor: If the introduction of CLR in pe-
riod 7 was not expected, a smaller number of families would have chosen education
in period 5.
The simulations reproduce key features of the data. First, both the simulation and
the data exhibit a hump-shape proﬁle in the skill premium (see Figure 8). Second,
in both the model and the data, fertility rates start declining before the introduction
of CLR, although the transition is sharper and more rapid in the simulation. This
discrepancy may be due to the fact that in the simulation CLR are introduced and
perfectly enforced instantaneously, whereas, in the data, this happens progressively.
Also, our model does not allow for combinations of schooling with part-time work,
while this practice was relatively widespread at the time.
Figures 16 and 17 show how the skill premium and the fraction of working children
would have evolved without the endogenous introduction of CLR. There is still a
peak in the evolution of the skill premium and a decline in child labor, but child labor
falls much less, and inequality remains much higher than with the introduction of
CLR. Thus, in the model, neither technological change nor CLR are solely responsible
for the decline in child labor; rather, both explanations are complementary.
The same theory which explains policy transitions also predicts that countries which
are initially similar might adopt different policies and therefore, might ultimately di-
verge. Picture two countries which both experience a temporary increase in the skill
premium, but the increase is slightly larger in country A than in country B. For ex-
ample, country B may be using a technology that is more intensive in unskilled labor.
It is then possible that in country A the majority votes in favor of CLR, thereby lead-
30ing the economy onto a future path with low fertility and inequality, while support
for CLR just fails to reach 50 percent in country B, so that large families and high
inequality would continue to dominate. Interpreted literally, our model implies that
such cross country differences in child labor might perpetuate forever, as long as each
country remains locked into its regime. In practice, many observers would argue that
child labor will ultimately disappear even without regulation if there is a sufﬁcient
rise in living standards, because parents will prefer to educate their children once
child labor is no longer an economic necessity. While this argument may have some
validity for industrialized countries given their very high levels of income per capita,
the experience of developing countries shows that widespread child labor can pre-
vail at income levels signiﬁcantly above those observed in Europe and the U.S. at
the time of the eradication of child labor. Moreover, increases in GDP per capita are
endogenous as well and related to the average education of the population.
Finally, the results suggest a reason why some econometric studies which ﬁnd that
child labor laws only have a relatively small effect on the supply of child labor may be
misleading. Moehling (1999) and others use state-by-state variation in the introduc-
tion of CLR in the U.S. to estimate the effects of regulations, employing a “difference-
in-difference” estimator. Our results show that child labor will typically decline even
before CLR are actually introduced, since young families start to have small fami-
lies of educated children in response to a higher return on education. The relative
decline in child labor in the periods before and after the introduction of restrictions
depends on average family size, the number of young families, and the enforcement
of CLR. Depending on these variables, it is possible that the measured impact of the
legislation is small (i.e., the difference in the decline of child labor before and after
the introduction of CLR, either within or across states). The true effect of CLR would
be larger than this empirical measure, since it is not generally true that the child la-
bor rate would have continued to decrease without a law. In our example, if no CLR
are introduced, child labor rates remain at 60 to 80 percent throughout. The restric-
tions therefore account for the major part of the ultimate decline in child labor. A
difference-in-difference estimator would have compared the decline in child labor
before and after the introduction of the law, which would suggest, misleadingly, a
much smaller effect of the legislation. To a large extent, CLR work indirectly by re-
ducing family size and changing families’ education decisions, as opposed to directly
removing children from the labor market who would otherwise have worked.
317 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to shed light on the political economy of child labor
laws. The key novelty of our model is an interaction between demographic variables
(the number of children per family as chosen by the parents) and political prefer-
ences. While it may seems obvious that whether or not a voter has working children
will inﬂuence preferences over child labor laws, our model shows that this fact leads
to surprising implications. Since the decision to have children is irreversible and
children are long-lived, fertility decisions can lock voters into speciﬁc political prefer-
ences. Multiple steady states can then arise, because CLR induce individual behavior
which, in turn, increases the support for maintaining the restrictions. This “lock-in”
effect can explain why we observe large variations in the incidence of child labor and
childlaborlawsacrosscountries ofsimilarincomelevels. Atypical examplewould be
the contrast between Latin American countries such as Mexico and Brazil and Asian
countries such as South Korea in 1960-90. In Mexico and Brazil (which have been
democracies for some time) there was comparatively little CLR, the enforcement of
the existing laws was lax, and the incidence of child labor was high. In South Korea,
there was more regulation, laws were actually enforced, and child labor rates were
very low. Consistent with the predictions of the model, fertility differentials between
rich and poor people were much higher in Mexico or Brazil than in South Korea (see
Alam and Casterline 1984 and Mboup and Saha 1998).
In order to account for the initial introduction of child labor laws, the model must be
extended to allow for a change in the economy which shifts political preferences in
favor of CLR. Here, our preferred explanation is technological progress which raises
the return to skilled labor, thereby providing incentives for parents to choose small
families and educate their children even while child labor continues to be legal. Once
the skill premium is sufﬁciently high, political pressure for the introduction of CLR
will endogenously rise. In our model, technological change and child labor legis-
lation are complementary explanations for the disappearance of child labor. While
the initial decline in child labor is caused by technological change raising the return
to education, this change later on triggers the introduction of legislation which ulti-
mately eliminates child labor completely. We concentrate on skill-biased technologi-
cal change as the original cause of fertility decline because this explanation is consis-
tent with evidence on trends in wage inequality in major industrializing countries in
32the nineteenth century21. However, other factors can trigger a similar transition, e.g.,
a fall in the relative productivity of child labor, or exogenous factors affecting fertility
rates.
Our theory can provide some guidance in the debate on the introduction of child
labor laws in developing countries. The model predicts that even in countries where
the majority currently opposes the introduction of CLR, the constituency in favor of
these laws may increase over time once the restrictions are in place. This statement
needs qualiﬁcations, though. First, if the cost of schooling is too high, poor parents
may decide not to send their children to school anyway. Second, if children are still
productive (in household or marginal activities), the policy may fail to reduce fertility
and induce the switch from quantity to quality. All agents, including children, might
in this case be worse off after CLR have been introduced. Therefore, CLR should be
accompanied by policies reducing the cost or increasing the accessibility of schools.
The mechanisms explored in this paper may be useful for an understanding of a va-
riety of of policy reforms that occur in the course of development. During the pe-
riod when child labor laws ﬁrst came into effect towards the end of the 19th century,
a number of industrializing countries also extended voting rights, introduced free,
public, and compulsory education, and started social insurance programs. Two re-
cent papers addressing some of these changes are Acemoglu and Robinson (2001),
where a rich elite introduces reforms to reduce a threat of revolution, and Galor and
Moav (2000), where social institutions are put into place in order to reap human cap-
ital externalities. The research outlined in this paper provides another perspective
which links policy reforms to changes in technology, but also to the major demo-
graphic changes which were taking place at the same time.
21See Williamson (1985)on Britain, Williamson and Lindert (1980) on the U.S., and Brenner, Kaelble,
and Thomas (1991) on Belgium, Germany, and Sweden.
33A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Characterization of Steady States Described in Section 4
A.1.1 All Workers Educate Their Children, ˜ η = 2
In this steady state, xGU = xGS = 0a n dePU = ePS = 1. Hence, L = 0. The neces-
sary and sufﬁcient condition for this steady state to be an equilibrium is that, given
wages, the unskilled adults ﬁnd it optimal to educate their children. By Lemma 1,
this implies, a fortiori, that the skilled adults also choose to educate their children.
The steady state utility of unskilled adults in the steady state where all children re-
ceive education is given by:
VPU,2 = u(wU,2 − pP)+λβz(π1VPS,2 +( 1 − π1)VPU,2)+( 1 − λ) βVPU,2,
where Vnh,˜ η denotes the steady state utility of an agent of family size n and skill h
conditional on ˜ η. A similar notation is used for wages. This equation can be solved
and expressed as:
VPU,2 =
u(wU,2 − pP) − Π
1,1
U→S[u(wU,2 − pP) − u(wS,2 − pP)]




h→h  denotes the average discounted probability for an agent who is cur-
rently of skill level h to have descendants of skill level h . The superscripts denote
whether the skilled and unskilled parents educate their children. The average dis-





1 − β(1 − λ)
.
For the candidate steady state to be sustained, deviations must be unproﬁtable, i.e.,
no agent can increase her utility by choosing a large family and making her children
work. Consider an unskilled adult who deviates and chooses a large family and child
labor. If this deviation is proﬁtable for the parent, it would also be proﬁtable for
a potential unskilled child. We therefore check a continued deviation of an entire
dynasty, i.e., we assume that the parent and all future unskilled descendants choose
a large family and child labor. The resulting utility is:
VGU,2 =
u(wU,2(1 + Gl)) − Π
0,1
U→S[u(wU,2(1 + Gl)) − u(wS,2 − pP)]







(1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z(π1 − π0))))
.
Comparing VPU,2 and VGU,2, we ﬁnd that the deviation is not proﬁtable as long as
u(wU,2(1 + Gl)) − u(wU,2 − pP) ≤ Π
0,1
U→S [u(wU,2(1 + Gl)) − u(wS,2 − pP)]
− Π
1,1
U→S [u(wU,2 − pP) − u(wS,2 − pP)]. (10)
Note that, since we consider individual deviations, we have held wages constant at
the steady state level. Inequality (10) is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a
steady state equilibrium where all agents educate their children (˜ η = 2) to be sus-
tained.
A.1.2 All Skilled and Some Unskilled Workers Educate Their Children, ˜ η ∈ (1,2)
A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for this equilibrium is that, for some ˜ η ∈ (1,2),
the skilled and unskilled wages, wS,˜ η and wU,˜ η, are such that VGU,˜ η = VPU,˜ η, i.e.,
u
 
wU,˜ η (1 + Gl)
 






















wS,˜ η − pP
  
. (11)
Recall that, by Lemma 1, VGU,˜ η = VPU,˜ η implies that VGS,˜ η < VPS,˜ η. Hence, skilled
adults strictly prefer small families with educated children.
A.1.3 All Skilled and No Unskilled Workers Educate Their Children, ˜ η = 1
In this steady state, xPU = 0, xGS = 0, eGU = 0, and ePS = 1. Hence, L = lGxGU.T w o
conditions need to be checked. First, skilled workers must prefer to educate their
children. Second, unskilled workers should prefer not to educate their children. For
one of the two groups, at least, the preference will be strict. Proceeding as before, we
ﬁnd:
VGU,1 =
u(wU,1 (1 + Gl))− Π
0,1
U→S (u(wU,1 (1 + Gl))− u(wS,1 − pP))
1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z))
, (12)
VPS,1 =
u(wS,1 − pP) − Π
0,1
S→U (u(wS,1 − pP) − u(wU,1 (1 + Gl)))







(1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z(π1 − π0))))
.
35Next, consider individual deviations. Consider, respectively, an unskilled parent who
decides to educate her children and a skilled parent who decides not to educate her
children. The deviating parent’s utility is:
VPU,1 =
u(wU,1 − pP) − Π
1,1
U→S (u(wU,1 − pP) − u(wS,1 − pP))
1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z))
,
VGS,1 =
u(wS,1 + wU,1Gl) − Π
0,0
S→U (u(wS,1 + wU,1Gl) − u(wU,1 (1 + Gl)))











The two deviations do not increase utility as long as, respectively,
u(wU,1(1 + Gl)) − u(wU,1 − pP) ≥ Π
0,1
U→S [u(wU,1(1 + Gl)) − u(wS,1 − pP)]
− Π
1,1
U→S [u(wU,1 − pP) − u(wS,1 − pP)], (14)
u(wS,1 + wU,1Gl) − u(wS,1 − pP) ≤ Π
0,0
S→U[u(wS,1 + wU,1Gl) − u(wU,1 (1 + Gl))]
− Π
0,1
S→U[u(wS,1 − pP) − u(wU,1 (1 + Gl))]. (15)
For our candidate steady state equilibrium to be sustained, both (14) and (15) must
hold simultaneously. To see that the range of parameters satisfying the two condi-
tions is not empty, consider a knife-edge economy such that (14) holds with equality,
i.e., given the wage premium consistent with ηS = 1 (skilled workers educate their
children) and ηU = 0, unskilled workers are indifferent between large and small fam-
ilies. Then, by Lemma 1, VGS,1 < VPS,1 . By continuity, the same inequality holds in
a neighborhood of this knife-edge economy where unskilled workers strictly prefer
large families. Therefore, the set of economies for which a steady state equilibrium
with ηU = 0a n dηS = 1e x i s t si sn o te m p t y .
A.1.4 Some Skilled and No Unskilled Workers Educate Their Children, ˜ η ∈ (0,1)
A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for this equilibrium is that, for some ˜ η ∈ (0,1),
the skilled and unskilled wages, wS,˜ η and wU,˜ η, are such that VGS,˜ η = VPS,˜ η, i.e.,
u
 
wS,˜ η + wU,˜ ηGl
 



















wU,˜ η (1 + Gl)
 
]. (16)
36Recall that, by Lemma 1, VGS,˜ η = VPS,˜ η implies that VGU,˜ η > VPU,˜ η. Hence, unskilled
adults strictly prefer large families with working children.
A.1.5 No Workers Educate Their Children, ˜ η = 0
In this steady state, no children receive education and all families are large. The nec-
essary and sufﬁcient condition for this steady state to be an equilibrium is that, given
wages, the skilled adults ﬁnd it optimal not to educate their children. By Lemma
1, this implies, a fortiori, that the unskilled adults also choose not to educate their
children. The steady state utility of skilled adults in this steady state is given by:
VGS,0 =
u(wS,0 + wU,0Gl) − Π
0,0
S→U[u(wS,0(1 + Gl)) − u(wS,0 + wU,0Gl)]
1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z))
. (17)
The utility from a deviation (educating children) is given by:
VPS,0 =
u(wS,0 − pP) − Π
0,1
S→U[u(wS,0 − pP) − u(wU,0 (1 + Gl))]
1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z))
,
The deviation is not proﬁtable as long as:
u(wS,1 + wU,1Gl) − u(wS,1 − pP) ≥ Π
0,0
S→U[u(wS,1 + wU,1Gl) − u(wU,1 (1 + Gl))].
(18)
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Proving that VGS(Ω) −VPS (Ω) < VGU (Ω) −VPU (Ω) is identical
to prove that:
(1 − β(1 − λ))· (VGS(Ω) − VGU (Ω)) < (1 − β(1 − λ))· (VPS (Ω) − VPU (Ω)).
From (1), plus being in a steady state (Ω = Ω ), it follows that:
(1 − β(1 − λ))· (VGS(Ω) − VGU (Ω)) = u(wS + wUlG) − u(wU + wUlG) <
u(wS − pP) − u(wU − pP)=( 1 − β(1 − λ))· (VPS (Ω) − VPU (Ω))
The last inequality follows from the concavity of the utility function. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Deﬁne q ≡ G/P > 1.
Part 1: The law of motion (6), together with the restriction that ηS = 1a n dxGS,t+1 = 0,
deﬁnes a system of four equations in four unknowns. The unique solution with non-
negative fractions of each type yields a solution for the growth rate of the population
37such that 1 + g/λ ≡ γ(ηU),w h e r eγ(ηU) is as deﬁned in the text. It is useful to note
that:
ψ(ηU) ≥ (1 +(1 − ηU)q((1 − π0) − (1 − π1))) ≡ ˜ ψ(ηU),
with strict inequality for any ηU < 1 (whereas ψ(1)= ˜ ψ(1)=1), and that:









2 − 4q(1 − ηU)(π1 − π0)
 
≤ γ(ηU),





(1 +( 1 − ηU)q(π1 − π0))+
 
(1 − (1 − ηU)q(π1 − π0))
2
 
= P ≤ γ(ηU).
Thus, λ(P − 1) is a lower bound to the growth rate of the population. Note also that
˜ ψ(ηU)
2 − 4q(1 − ηU)(π1 − π0)=( 1 − (1 − ηU)q(π1 − π0))
2 > 0, hence, ψ(ηU)
2 −
4q(1 − ηU)(π1 − π0) > 0, i.e., γ(ηU) ∈ R+.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
γ  (ηU) < ˜ γ  (ηU)=0,
proving that g is uniformly decreasing in ηU.
Part 2: The law of motion (6), together with the restriction that η = 0a n dxPU,t+1 = 0
deﬁnes a system of four equations in four unknowns. The unique solution with non-
negative fractions of each type yields a solution for the growth rate of the population
such that 1 + g/λ ≡ γS (ηS),w h e r eγS (ηS) is as deﬁned in the text. First, note that
the discriminant in the deﬁnition of γS (ηS) is positive, since:
ψS (η)
2 − 4qηS (π1 − π0) ≥ (1 + ηSq(π1 − π0))
2 − 4ηSq(π1 − π0)=
(1 − ηSq(π1 − π0))
2 ≥ 0.
Next, observe that:














38and, moreover, γ 
S (ηS) < ˜ γ 
S (ηS). Finally, note that:



























































implying that ˜ γ 
S (ηS)=0. This establishes that γ 
S (ηS) < 0, i.e., g is uniformly de-
creasing in ηS. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Once more, the two cases of ηU ∈ (0,1) and ηS ∈ (0,1) are
parallel. We therefore concentrate on the case ηU ∈ (0,1) (which implies ηS = 1.
Using the solution for g and the deﬁnition of γ(ηU) deﬁned in the proof of Lemma 2,
we can solve for the steady state proportion of each type, as a function of ηU:
ξPU (ηU)=
GηU ((1 − π0) − P(π1 − π0)/γ (ηU))
γ(ηU)+(G − P) ηU +(Gπ0 − Pπ1)(1 − ηU)
,
ξGU (ηU)=
γ(ηU) − P(ηU + π1 (1 − ηU))
γ(ηU)+(G − P) ηU +(Gπ0 − Pπ1)(1 − ηU)
,
ξPS (ηU)=
Gπ0 + GPηU (π1 − π0)/γ (ηU)
γ(ηU)+(G − P) ηU +(Gπ0 − Pπ1)(1 − ηU)
.
We now calculate the total derivative of ξPS (ηU) :
ξ 
PS (ηU)=2P2 (π1 − π0)λ3
 
F (ηU) P +(G (1 − π0) − P(π1 − π0))
 
ψ(ηU)








ηU (1 − π0)
2 + π0 (3 − π0) − 2π1
 
+(π1 − π0)(ηU + π1 (1 − ηU)).
39We want to prove that ξ 
PS (ηU) ≥ 0f o ra l lηU ∈ [0,1]. To this aim, we deﬁne the
function:
˜ ξ (ηU)= 2P3 (π1 − π0)λ3
 
F (ηU)+( q(1 − π0) − (π1 − π0))
 
˜ ψ(ηU)
2 − 4q(1 − ηU)(π1 − π0)
 




q2 (1 − π0) − (π1 − π0)
 
+
q(2(π0 (1 − ηU)+ηU)+( 1 − π1)(1 − ηU))
 
,
w h e r ew eh a v et h a t¯ ξ (ηU) ≥ ˜ ξ (ηU). It is immediate to verify that ˜ ξ (ηU) ≥ 0,
with strict inequality holding whenever π0 < π1 < 1. Hence, ξ 
PS (ηU) ≥ 0. In
fact, ξ 
PS (ηU) > 0 whenever π0 < π1 < 1. A parallel argument applies to the case
ηS ∈ (0,1). It therefore follows that ratio of skilled to unskilled labor supply increases
with with both ηU and ηS. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: We begin by deﬁning the utility differential for unskilled and
skilled adults between having large and small families in steady state:
∆U (˜ η)=VGU,˜ η − VPU,˜ η,
∆S (˜ η)=VGS,˜ η − VPS,˜ η.
According to conditions (10), (11), (14), (15), (16), and (18), a steady state of type
˜ η = 2e x i s t si f∆U(2) ≤ 0, type ˜ η ∈ (1,2) exists if ∆U(˜ η)=0f o rs o m e˜ η ∈ (1,2),
type ˜ η = 1e x i s t si f∆U(˜ η) ≥ 0a n d∆S(˜ η) ≤ 0, type ˜ η ∈ (0,1) exists if ∆S(˜ η)=0
for some ˜ η ∈ (0,1),a n d ,ﬁ n a l l y ,t y p e˜ η = 0e x i s t si f∆S(0) ≥ 0. A unique steady
state therefore exists if ∆U (˜ η) and ∆S (˜ η) are strictly monotonically increasing in ˜ η.
Given that Lemma 3 establishes that the wage premium is strictly decreasing in ˜ η,f o r
the skilled adults this monotonicity is immediate. The situation is more complicated
for the unskilled adults, since there are two opposing effects: as the skill premium
rises, education becomes more attractive, but also less affordable. Writing steady
















wS,˜ η − pP
  
1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z))
,
VPU,˜ η =








wS,˜ η − pP
 
]
1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z))
.





1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z))
 
u   






(1 + Gl) w 
U,˜ η
− u   
wU,˜ η − pP






U,˜ η − u   
wS,˜ η − pP












U,˜ η > 0, w 




U→S > 0. It therefore sufﬁces to show that:
u   






(1 + Gl) > u   
wU,˜ η − pP














u (wU,˜ η − pP)
u   
wU,˜ η(1 + Gl))
 .
Under CRRA, the right-hand side is increasing in the wage and, therefore, Assump-
tion 2 is a sufﬁcient condition for a unique steady state to exist. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: To begin, set β = 0 (to be relaxed later), choose an arbitrary
G > 0, and choose λ, π0,a n dπ1 > π0 such that the old unskilled are always in
majority (i.e., (1 − λ)(1 − π1) > 0.5), which satisﬁes the ﬁrst condition in the propo-
sition. Since given β = 0 the future is not valued, there is no incentive for education.
Therefore without CLR, for any positive values of the remaining parameters p and P
the steady state with ˜ η = 0 prevails (all families are large), satisfying the second part
of the proposition. Conversely, when CLR are in place (combined with a compulsory
education policy) the steady state is ˜ η = 2, as all families are small to economize on
the educational cost.
We still need to show that we can choose p and P such that both CLR and no CLR
are SSPE, and that the assumption β = 0 can be relaxed. First, assume that the steady
state without CLR prevails. We want to ﬁnd conditions such that the (old unskilled)
majority would vote against CLR if a referendum occurred. In the steady state with-
out CLR, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor supply is:
x0 =
π0
1 − π0 + Gl
,
and the corresponding unskilled wage is wU,0 = f(x0) − f  (x0)x0.I fC L Ra r ei n t r o -





and the corresponding wage ˜ wU,0 = f(˜ x0) − f  (˜ x0) ˜ x0 satisﬁes wU,0 < ˜ wU,0. However,
41the unskilled workers also lose child labor income and have to pay the schooling cost.
The old unskilled majority votes against CLR if their consumption is lower under
CLR, i.e., if:
wU,0(1 + Gl) > ˜ wU,0 − pG
is satisﬁed. Clearly, the education cost p can always be chosen sufﬁciently high such
that the majority of unskilled agents opposes the introduction of CLR.
Now consider the case where currently the steady state with CLR prevails. We want
to ﬁnd conditions under which the (old unskilled) majority would prefer to keep CLR





and the corresponding unskilled wage is wU,2 = f(x2) − f  (x2)x2.I fC L Ra r ea b a n -
doned, all children will enter the labor market, and young families will choose the
large family size G. The ensuing skill ratio is:
˜ x2 =
π1
1 − π1 +( 1 − λ)Pl + λGl
,
and the corresponding wage ˜ wU,2 = f( ˜ x2) − f  ( ˜ x2)˜ x2 satisﬁes ˜ wU,2 < wU,2.T h eo l d
unskilled will vote to maintain CLR if their consumption falls if CLR are abandoned,
i.e.:
wU,2 − pP > ˜ wU,2(1 + Pl).
This condition can be satisﬁed by choosing P sufﬁciently small. Notice that ˜ wU,2 does
not converge to wU,2 as P goes to zero, because the young adults choose the large
family size G. By choosing P, we can therefore ensure that the majority votes to keep
CLR in place. We have therefore found a set of parameters for which multiple SSPE
exist. Finally, since utility is continuous in β, the same result can be obtained for
positive β, sufﬁciently close to zero, and the same remaining parameters. Q.E.D.
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45Quintile in Ten Years
Current Quintile High ··· Low
High 0.80 0.15 0.03 0.02 0
0.13 0.53 0.13 0.18 0.03
··· 0.05 0.17 0.48 0.25 0.05
0.02 0.15 0.32 0.38 0.13
Low 0 0 0.04 0.17 0.79







































































































wS/wU ¯ wS/ ¯ wU
Figure 5: Steady StatesFigure 6: steady state ˜ η (Unskilled Parents with Small Families) as a Function of α











































































































































Figure 11: Schooling in U.K.Figure 12: Parameter α over Time































Figure 13: Wage Premium over Time, Endogenous PolicyFigure 14: Fraction of Children Working, Endogenous Policy















































Figure 15: Population Growth over Time, Endogenous PolicyFigure 16: Wage Premium over Time, Exogenous Policy







































Figure 17: Fraction of Children Working, Exogenous Policy